Require authoritative Drive ACL and inheritance proof before Greif custody

This commit is contained in:
NewMeltAssist committed 2026-11-19 20:48:54 +08:00
1 parent ff3f1350c7
commit dbb03c7dfa
10 files changed
+2876 -10

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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
{
"status": "PASS",
"tests": 18,
"acl_cases": {
"inherited-outside": {
"custody_reached": false,
"synthetic_reads": 0,
"provider_queries": [
[
"fixture-archive",
null
],
[
"fixture-archive/permissions",
null
],
[
"1quVPlAkM8lK95siVoA0YQ23I9I-0kch3",
null
],
[
"1quVPlAkM8lK95siVoA0YQ23I9I-0kch3/permissions",
null
],
[
"root",
null
],
[
"0AD1IMHKOPZB4Uk9PVA/permissions",
null
]
]
},
"no-transport": {
"custody_reached": false,
"synthetic_reads": 0,
"provider_queries": []
},
"missing-acl": {
"custody_reached": false,
"synthetic_reads": 0,
"provider_queries": [
[
"fixture-archive",
null
],
[
"fixture-archive/permissions",
null
]
]
},
"project-only": {
"custody_reached": true,
"synthetic_reads": 1,
"provider_queries": [
[
"fixture-archive",
null
],
[
"fixture-archive/permissions",
null
],
[
"1quVPlAkM8lK95siVoA0YQ23I9I-0kch3",
null
],
[
"1quVPlAkM8lK95siVoA0YQ23I9I-0kch3/permissions",
null
],
[
"root",
null
],
[
"0AD1IMHKOPZB4Uk9PVA/permissions",
null
],
[
"fixture-archive",
null
],
[
"1quVPlAkM8lK95siVoA0YQ23I9I-0kch3",
null
],
[
"root",
null
]
]
},
"anyone-link-page2": {
"custody_reached": false,
"synthetic_reads": 0,
"provider_queries": [
[
"fixture-archive",
null
],
[
"fixture-archive/permissions",
null
],
[
"fixture-archive/permissions",
"fixture-page-2"
]
]
},
"other-folder": {
"custody_reached": false,
"synthetic_reads": 0,
"provider_queries": []
}
},
"contract_sha256": "c3074afd0d124a6351275f3c9c33e96038d6be3e2687223033fa66573c57c94a",
"comparison_preserved_sha256": "9d42281db903a9fc268328e40d1f54c4a037f3cf58573e6fc78c9bb63ab3788e",
"previous_contract_sha256": "f56e0d1a0e64fb46f2af6a731730308856083bdd18cfe030ab478b0cd841d539",
"actual_gpu_queries": 0,
"actual_target_reads": 0,
"actual_uploads": 0,
"runtime_drive_credential_present": false,
"replay_log_sha256": "a57e51c2f9bf92919bb10170c625b119253ca06f4a3658e99f865d0789594b83"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
test_inherited_non_project_user_is_blocked (test_track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.CustodyACL) ... ok
test_missing_current_transport_and_missing_effective_acl_stop (test_track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.CustodyACL) ... ok
test_project_acl_and_entire_ancestry_positive_control (test_track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.CustodyACL) ... ok
test_unlisted_link_reader_is_blocked_even_on_later_page (test_track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.CustodyACL) ... ok
test_wrong_folder_is_rejected_before_provider_access (test_track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.CustodyACL) ... ok
test_all_19_columns_contribute_and_mass_is_preserved (test_track_b_gino_greif_adapter.GreifAdapter) ... ok
test_exact_gather_on_affine_field_and_isotropic_translation (test_track_b_gino_greif_adapter.GreifAdapter) ... ok
test_pinned_model_full_64_cpu_forward_and_small_backward (test_track_b_gino_greif_adapter.GreifAdapter) ... ok
test_real_production_guard_idle_and_busy_with_frozen_limits (test_track_b_gino_greif_adapter.GreifAdapter) ... ok
test_release_gate_requires_both_full_folds_and_respects_phase_cap (test_track_b_gino_greif_adapter.GreifAdapter) ... ok
test_source_columns_and_h2_paired_domain (test_track_b_gino_greif_adapter.GreifAdapter) ... ok
test_actual_checkpoint_preserves_optimizer_for_second_update (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
test_first_cost_gate_counts_spent_and_blocks_over_budget (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
test_matching_drive_checksum_is_required (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
test_no_review_prevents_any_gpu_probe (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
test_replays_actual_production_guard_and_stage_order (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
test_scoring_decision_fixed_roster_and_named_hard_intersection (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
test_two_predictions_share_exactly_one_mock_target_open (test_track_b_gino_greif_combined.Combined) ... ok
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ran 18 tests in 10.815s
OK
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# GINO-Greif 保管权限差量复审
MeltAssist 在旧绑定 `f46f4036` 发现,只要本地回执写 `project_private=true`,缺权限或仅凭链接可读的文件都能到达留出读取。该回执现只用于绑定上传文件 ID、父目录和冻结归档,评分器从 Google Drive API 获取实际权限证据。 [原阻塞回执](https://arcticnimbus.slack.com/archives/C0C78UFKGRM/p1795092014928129) · [修订保管门](../tools/track_b_gino_greif_custody.py)
校验只涉及新归档、固定私有项目目录及其 My Drive 根。评分器走 HTTPS GET 读取 Google Drive v3 文件元数据及逐页权限,包括 published 视图。它核对原始二进制文件 SHA-256 和大小,核对父目录链、拥有者可见权限 ID 全集及前后文件版本,再保存实际权限证据。固定项目目录的既有只读元数据仅列已核项目拥有者,同一身份的归档及祖先 ACL 才能通过。任何 `anyone` 权限都拒绝,含 `allowFileDiscovery=false` 的凭链接访问。组、域、公开视图、项目外用户、无法核对的上级目录或中途权限变化也拒绝。 [Live ACL 实现](../tools/track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.py) · [Drive 权限和继承](https://developers.google.com/workspace/drive/api/guides/manage-sharing) · [逐页权限 API](https://developers.google.com/workspace/drive/api/reference/rest/v3/permissions/list)
CPU 回放走了生产 `score()` 入口,在网络一层提供合成 API 响应。缺有效权限数据、后续页出现凭链接读权限、继承来的项目外用户及错误目录均在创建保管目录前拒绝,目标读为零。项目内权限对照先固定证据哈希,再到达合成目标读取一次。保留两套原 CPU 回放,共 18 项通过。预登记比较合同逐字一致,模型、训练、预算和评分定义沿原绑定。 [回放回执](../artifacts/track-b-gino-greif-preparation-2026-11-19/combined-review-acl-v2/cpu-replay.json)
当前连接器能返回经裁剪的目录权限视图,权限 ID 和继承细节没有随响应提供。当前 Horsea 运行时未配置已授权的原始只读权限查询通道。生产路径只用已有授权凭据提供的只读传输,缺此通道即停在保管门。合成验收不能替代实际项目权限放行。本次仅读取固定项目目录与直接祖先的元数据,无权限更新、上传、留出目标读取和 GPU 查询。 [Drive 只读元数据说明](https://developers.google.com/workspace/drive/api/guides/file-metadata)
+3 -1
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@@ -165,7 +165,9 @@ class Combined(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(PermissionError):
custody.verify_drive(auth)
save(root/'drive-readback.json',dict(receipt,sha256Checksum=sha(path)))
self.assertEqual(custody.verify_drive(auth)['file_id'],'fixture')
with patch.object(custody,'prove_drive_acl',return_value={'file_id':'fixture'}) as acl:
self.assertEqual(custody.verify_drive(auth)['file_id'],'fixture')
acl.assert_called_once_with('fixture','folder-fixture',sha(path),bundle['bytes'])
def test_two_predictions_share_exactly_one_mock_target_open(self):
with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
+139
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@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
"""Exercise the real Greif custody gate with synthetic Drive API metadata."""
from contextlib import ExitStack
import hashlib
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
import track_b_gino_greif_custody as custody
import track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl as acl
import track_b_gino_greif_entry as entry
from track_b_gino_shapenet_entry import read, save, sha
EVIDENCE = {}
OWNER_EMAIL = 'fixture-owner@example.invalid'
ARCHIVE_ID = 'fixture-archive'
class CustodyACL(unittest.TestCase):
def replay(self, mode):
with TemporaryDirectory() as folder, ExitStack() as stack:
root = Path(folder)
for name in ('contract.json','models-frozen.json','predictions-frozen.json'):
save(root/name, {})
archive = root/'gino-greif-models-and-predictions.zip'
archive.write_bytes(b'synthetic immutable archive')
digest, size = sha(archive), archive.stat().st_size
scope = dict(private_drive_folder_id=acl.PROJECT_FOLDER)
if mode == 'other-folder':
scope['private_drive_folder_id'] = 'out-of-scope'
bundle = dict(path=str(archive), sha256=digest, bytes=size,contract_sha256=sha(root/'contract.json'),
model_index_sha256=sha(root/'models-frozen.json'),
prediction_index_sha256=sha(root/'predictions-frozen.json'))
save(root/'drive-upload-index.json',bundle)
# This is the assertion that formerly bypassed all permission checks.
save(root/'drive-readback.json',dict(sha256Checksum=digest,size=str(size),
parent_id=scope['private_drive_folder_id'],file_id=ARCHIVE_ID,project_private=True,
contract_sha256=bundle['contract_sha256']))
case = 'synthetic_part'
compare = root/'comparison.json'
reference = root/'reference.json'
save(reference,dict(status='COMPLETE',rows=[dict(case=case)]+[
dict(case=f'other-{i}') for i in range(551)]))
save(compare,dict(roster=[dict(case=case,fold=0)],h2_score=dict(path=str(reference),sha256=sha(reference))))
pilot, query = root/'pilot.json',root/'query.json'
save(pilot,{})
save(query,dict(rows=[dict(case=case,included=True)]))
pins = {str(p):sha(p) for p in (pilot,query)}
c=dict(budgets={'score_cpu_seconds':3600},comparison_contract=str(compare),comparison_contract_sha256=sha(compare))
forecasts=[dict(case=case,fold=0,seed=s) for s in (0,1)]
owner=dict(id='fixture-owner-id',type='user',role='owner',emailAddress=OWNER_EMAIL)
inherited=dict(id='foreign-id',type='user',role='reader',emailAddress='foreign@example.invalid',
permissionDetails=[dict(inherited=True,inheritedFrom=acl.PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT)])
linked=dict(id='anyone',type='anyone',role='reader',allowFileDiscovery=False)
calls=[]
def provider(path, query, token):
self.assertEqual(token,'fixture-token')
calls.append((path, query.get('pageToken')))
if path.endswith('/permissions'):
self.assertEqual(query['includePermissionsForView'],'published')
if mode=='missing-acl' and path==ARCHIVE_ID+'/permissions':
return {}
if mode=='anyone-link-page2' and path==ARCHIVE_ID+'/permissions':
if query.get('pageToken')=='fixture-page-2':
return dict(permissions=[linked])
return dict(permissions=[owner],nextPageToken='fixture-page-2')
if mode=='inherited-outside' and path==acl.PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT+'/permissions':
return dict(permissions=[owner,inherited])
return dict(permissions=[owner])
item=dict(id=path,ownedByMe=True,trashed=False,version='1',permissionIds=[owner['id']],mimeType=acl.FOLDER_TYPE)
if path==ARCHIVE_ID:
return dict(item,parents=[acl.PROJECT_FOLDER],mimeType='application/zip',size=str(size),sha256Checksum=digest)
if path==acl.PROJECT_FOLDER:
return dict(item,parents=[acl.PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT])
if path=='root':
return dict(item,id=acl.PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT)
raise AssertionError('Unexpected item outside the fixed chain')
stack.enter_context(patch.dict('os.environ',CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES=''))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(entry,'ROOT',root))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(entry,'authorize',return_value=(scope,0.)))
for k,v in dict(PILOT=pilot,QUERY=query,PINS=pins).items():
stack.enter_context(patch.object(custody,k,v))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(custody,'frozen',return_value=([],forecasts)))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(custody.resource,'setrlimit'))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(acl,'PROJECT_OWNER_SHA256',hashlib.sha256(OWNER_EMAIL.encode()).hexdigest()))
if mode=='no-transport':
custody.os.environ.pop(acl.TOKEN_FD,None)
else:
stack.enter_context(patch.object(acl,'_credential',return_value='fixture-token'))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(acl,'_get_json',side_effect=provider))
stack.enter_context(patch.object(custody,'summary',return_value={}))
read_target=stack.enter_context(patch.object(custody,'target_array',return_value='synthetic target'))
def case_reached(*_):
proof=root/'score/drive-acl-evidence.json'
self.assertEqual(read(root/'score/custody-start.json')['drive_acl_evidence_sha256'],sha(proof))
read_target({},case)
return dict(case=case)
reader=stack.enter_context(patch.object(custody,'one_case',side_effect=case_reached))
if mode=='project-only':
self.assertEqual(custody.score(c),0)
read_target.assert_called_once()
proof=read(root/'score/drive-acl-evidence.json')
self.assertEqual([x['file_id'] for x in proof['chain']],
[ARCHIVE_ID,acl.PROJECT_FOLDER,acl.PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT])
EVIDENCE[mode] = dict(custody_reached=True,synthetic_reads=1,provider_queries=calls)
else:
with self.assertRaises(PermissionError):
custody.score(c)
reader.assert_not_called()
read_target.assert_not_called()
self.assertFalse((root/'score').exists())
EVIDENCE[mode] = dict(custody_reached=False,synthetic_reads=0,provider_queries=calls)
def test_missing_current_transport_and_missing_effective_acl_stop(self):
for mode in ('no-transport','missing-acl'):
self.replay(mode)
def test_unlisted_link_reader_is_blocked_even_on_later_page(self):
self.replay('anyone-link-page2')
self.assertIn((ARCHIVE_ID+'/permissions','fixture-page-2'), EVIDENCE['anyone-link-page2']['provider_queries'])
def test_inherited_non_project_user_is_blocked(self):
self.replay('inherited-outside')
def test_wrong_folder_is_rejected_before_provider_access(self):
self.replay('other-folder')
self.assertEqual(EVIDENCE['other-folder']['provider_queries'],[])
def test_project_acl_and_entire_ancestry_positive_control(self):
self.replay('project-only')
if __name__=='__main__':
unittest.main()
+12 -7
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from phase2_h2_data import cached
from s2_custody_common import prediction_inputs
from s2_custody_statistics import part_metrics
import track_b_gino_greif_entry as entry
from track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl import prove as prove_drive_acl
from track_b_gino_greif_prepare import PILOT, QUERY, PINS
from track_b_gino_shapenet_entry import BASE, checked, read, save, sha
@@ -80,14 +81,14 @@ def verify_drive(auth):
or bundle['prediction_index_sha256']!=sha(root/'predictions-frozen.json')):
raise ValueError('Local archive no longer matches the fixed models and forecasts')
receipt=read(root/'drive-readback.json')
# Drive file metadata, recorded by the authorized connector from the private project folder.
# Transfer bookkeeping binds the file ID to the expected archive. The
# actual ACL and remote file identity come from the live provider.
if (receipt.get('sha256Checksum'),receipt.get('size'),receipt.get('parent_id')) != (
bundle['sha256'],str(bundle['bytes']),auth['private_drive_folder_id']):
raise PermissionError('Private Drive readback SHA, size and folder are required before scoring')
if (not receipt.get('file_id') or receipt.get('project_private') is not True
or receipt.get('contract_sha256')!=bundle['contract_sha256']):
raise PermissionError('Private Drive identity required before opening targets')
return receipt
if receipt.get('contract_sha256')!=bundle['contract_sha256']:
raise PermissionError('Drive transfer does not match the reviewed contract')
return prove_drive_acl(receipt.get('file_id'),auth['private_drive_folder_id'],bundle['sha256'],bundle['bytes'])
def bootstrap(rows, metric, fixed_support=None):
@@ -194,12 +195,16 @@ def score(c):
query={r['case']:r for r in read(checked(QUERY,PINS[str(QUERY)]))['rows'] if r['included']}
out=entry.ROOT/'score'
out.mkdir(exist_ok=False)
evidence=out/'drive-acl-evidence.json'
save(evidence,dict(drive,observed_before_target_reads=True))
save(out/'custody-start.json',dict(unix=time.time(),drive_file_id=drive['file_id'],
manifest_sha256=sha(entry.ROOT/'predictions-frozen.json'),before_test_target_reads=True))
drive_acl_evidence_sha256=sha(evidence), manifest_sha256=sha(entry.ROOT/'predictions-frozen.json'),
before_test_target_reads=True))
results=[]
with (out/'heldout-target-access.jsonl').open('x') as log:
for row in compare['roster']:
results.append(one_case(pilot,query[row['case']],row,new,reference,log))
save(out/'result.json',dict(status='COMPLETE',summary=summary(results,compare),rows=results,
unique_test_target_reads=len(results),no_new_decode=True,drive_file_id=drive['file_id']))
unique_test_target_reads=len(results),no_new_decode=True,drive_file_id=drive['file_id'],
drive_acl_evidence_sha256=sha(evidence)))
return 0
+132
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@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
"""Prove the fixed project's effective ACL with live, owner-visible Drive metadata."""
import hashlib
import http.client
import json
import os
import re
from urllib.parse import urlencode
PROJECT_FOLDER = '1quVPlAkM8lK95siVoA0YQ23I9I-0kch3'
PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT = '0AD1IMHKOPZB4Uk9PVA'
PROJECT_OWNER_SHA256 = 'feb12acc4cc98e55902b56268f726f3489d3e5baaf6aafef2fbff7e485f2a1b2'
TOKEN_FD = 'MELTMIND_DRIVE_METADATA_TOKEN_FD'
HOST = 'www.googleapis.com'
FOLDER_TYPE = 'application/vnd.google-apps.folder'
FILE_FIELDS = 'id,parents,driveId,mimeType,ownedByMe,trashed,permissionIds,version,size,sha256Checksum'
ACL_FIELDS = ('nextPageToken,permissions(id,type,role,emailAddress,domain,allowFileDiscovery,deleted,view,'
'permissionDetails(inherited,inheritedFrom,permissionType,role))')
ID = re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\Z')
def _credential():
fd = os.environ.get(TOKEN_FD, '')
if not fd.isascii() or not fd.isdecimal() or int(fd) < 3:
raise PermissionError('Existing authorized Drive metadata transport is unavailable')
try:
with os.fdopen(os.dup(int(fd)), 'rb') as source:
token = source.readline(8193).strip().decode('ascii')
except (OSError, ValueError, UnicodeError):
raise PermissionError('Existing authorized Drive metadata transport is unavailable') from None
if not token or len(token) > 8192 or any(not 33 <= ord(ch) <= 126 for ch in token):
raise PermissionError('Drive metadata transport provided no usable credential')
return token
def _get_json(path, query, token):
connection = http.client.HTTPSConnection(HOST, timeout=15)
try:
connection.request('GET', '/drive/v3/files/' + path + '?' + urlencode(query),
headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + token, 'Accept': 'application/json'})
response = connection.getresponse()
if response.status != 200:
raise PermissionError(f'Authoritative Drive metadata status {response.status}')
data = response.read(2**20 + 1)
if len(data) > 2**20:
raise PermissionError('Oversized Drive metadata')
value = json.loads(data)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise PermissionError('Invalid Drive metadata response')
return value
except PermissionError:
raise
except (OSError, ValueError, http.client.HTTPException):
raise PermissionError('Authoritative Drive metadata could not be verified') from None
finally:
connection.close()
def _listed_permissions(file_id, token):
query = dict(fields=ACL_FIELDS, pageSize=100, supportsAllDrives='true', includePermissionsForView='published')
rows, seen = [], set()
for _ in range(20):
page = _get_json(file_id + '/permissions', query, token)
permissions = page.get('permissions')
if not isinstance(permissions, list):
raise PermissionError('Missing effective Drive permissions')
rows.extend(permissions)
if 'nextPageToken' not in page:
return rows
next_page = page['nextPageToken']
if not isinstance(next_page, str) or not next_page or next_page in seen:
raise PermissionError('Incomplete Drive permissions pagination')
seen.add(next_page)
query['pageToken'] = next_page
raise PermissionError('Incomplete Drive permissions pagination')
def _member_evidence(item, token):
rows = _listed_permissions(item['id'], token)
provider_ids = item.get('permissionIds')
if not rows or not isinstance(provider_ids, list) or not all(isinstance(p, str) and p for p in provider_ids):
raise PermissionError('No complete effective Drive permissions evidence')
matches, ids = [], set()
for row in rows:
if not isinstance(row, dict) or row.get('type') != 'user' or row.get('view') == 'published':
raise PermissionError('Public, linked, group or domain Drive access is out of scope')
email, pid, role = row.get('emailAddress'), row.get('id'), row.get('role')
if (not isinstance(email, str) or not isinstance(pid, str) or not pid or pid in ids
or role not in ('owner', 'writer', 'commenter', 'reader') or row.get('deleted') is True):
raise PermissionError('Unverifiable Drive principal or role')
principal = hashlib.sha256(email.strip().casefold().encode()).hexdigest()
if principal != PROJECT_OWNER_SHA256:
raise PermissionError('Drive access outside the verified project principal')
ids.add(pid)
matches.append(dict(id=pid,type='user',role=role,principal_sha256=principal,
permission_details=row.get('permissionDetails', [])))
if ids != set(provider_ids) or not any(p['role']=='owner' for p in matches):
raise PermissionError('Owner-visible effective Drive ACL is incomplete')
return matches
def prove(file_id, folder_id, digest, size):
if (folder_id != PROJECT_FOLDER or not isinstance(file_id, str) or not ID.fullmatch(file_id)
or file_id in (PROJECT_FOLDER, PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT, 'root')):
raise PermissionError('Archive must be in the fixed project folder')
token = _credential()
query = dict(fields=FILE_FIELDS, supportsAllDrives='true')
lookup = ((file_id, file_id, [PROJECT_FOLDER]), (PROJECT_FOLDER, PROJECT_FOLDER, [PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT]),
('root', PROJECT_MY_DRIVE_ROOT, []))
observations = []
for locator, expected_id, parents in lookup:
item = _get_json(locator, query, token)
if (item.get('id') != expected_id or item.get('parents', []) != parents or item.get('driveId')
or item.get('ownedByMe') is not True or item.get('trashed') is not False
or not isinstance(item.get('version'), str) or not item['version'].isdecimal()):
raise PermissionError('Drive archive or inheritance chain does not match the fixed project')
if locator == file_id:
if (item.get('mimeType') not in ('application/zip','application/x-zip','application/x-zip-compressed')
or (item.get('sha256Checksum'),item.get('size')) != (digest,str(size))):
raise PermissionError('Authoritative Drive archive bytes do not match the frozen bundle')
elif item.get('mimeType') != FOLDER_TYPE:
raise PermissionError('Drive inheritance parent is not a folder')
observations.append((locator, item, _member_evidence(item, token)))
# Require stable metadata across the three ACL reads, including each ancestor's version.
for locator, item, _ in observations:
if _get_json(locator, query, token) != item:
raise PermissionError('Drive metadata changed during ACL verification')
return dict(source='live Google Drive v3 files.get and exhaustive permissions.list',
file_id=file_id,parent_id=folder_id,bytes=size,sha256=digest,
chain=[dict(file_id=item['id'],version=item['version'],parents=item.get('parents', []),
effective_permissions=permissions) for _,item,permissions in observations])
+4 -2
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from track_b_gino_formal_guard import guard
from track_b_gino_shapenet_entry import BASE, checked, read, save, sha
ROOT = prep.ROOT / 'combined-review'
ROOT = prep.ROOT / 'combined-review-acl-v2'
SOURCE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
ADAPTER = prep.REVIEW_ROOT / 'preparation-binding.json'
ADAPTER_SHA = '01d6581c33a6c26d1965acb13248bdb741de892e5929fff08a7e4af431f00d0b'
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ def expected_contract():
raise ValueError('Pre-registered Greif comparison differs')
code=dict(base['code_sha256'],**c['code_sha256'])
for name in ('track_b_gino_greif_entry.py','track_b_gino_greif_worker.py','track_b_gino_greif_custody.py',
'track_b_gino_greif_drive_acl.py',
'phase2_h2_model.py','phase2_h2_data.py','s2_custody_common.py','s2_custody_statistics.py'):
code[str(SOURCE/name)] = sha(SOURCE/name)
return dict(handoff='h-08c2a2a5',mode='gino-greif-combined',adapter_sha256=ADAPTER_SHA,
@@ -73,7 +74,8 @@ def expected_contract():
run_order=['two first epochs as part of seed0 fits','reviewed cost gate','complete all four fits',
'freeze models','form four target-free prediction sets','freeze predictions',
'verified private Drive transfer','one controlled custody pass'],
drive={'purpose':'immutable model and prediction bundle','git':'small SHA indexes and receipts only'},
drive={'purpose':'immutable model and prediction bundle','git':'small SHA indexes and receipts only',
'acl_revision':'h-17e62811 live exhaustive Drive ACL and fixed owner-only inheritance chain'},
no_retry=True)